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Abstract—In this paper, we study the problem of remote
state estimation, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. An
authorized user estimates the state of an unstable linear plant,
based on the packets received from a sensor, while the packets
may also be intercepted by the eavesdropper. Our goal is to
design a coding scheme at the sensor, which encodes the state
information, in order to impair the eavesdropper’s estimation
performance, while enabling the user to successfully decode the
sent messages. We introduce a novel class of codes, termed State-
Secrecy Codes, which use acknowledgment signals from the user
and apply linear time-varying transformations to the current
and previously received states. By exploiting the properties of
the system’s process noise, the channel physical model and the
dynamics, these codes manage to be fast, efficient and, thus,
suitable for real-time dynamical systems. We prove that under
minimal conditions, State-Secrecy Codes achieve perfect secrecy,
namely the eavesdropper’s estimation error grows unbounded
almost surely, while the user’s estimation performance is optimal.
These conditions only require that at least once, the user receives
the corresponding packet while the eavesdropper fails to intercept
it. Even one occurrence of this event renders the eavesdropper’s
error unbounded with asymptotically optimal rate of increase.
State-Secrecy Codes are provided and studied for two cases,
i) when direct state measurements are available, and ii) when
we only have output measurements. The theoretical results are
illustrated in simulations.
Index Terms—Eavesdropping, State-Secrecy Codes, Perfect
secrecy, Kalman filtering
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) as a
collection of interconnected sensors and actuators has created a
new attack surface for adversarial attacks [1], [2]. Research ef-
forts in the context of control systems have targeted denial-of-
service attacks [3] and data integrity of compromised sensors
[4], [5], [6], [7]. However, another fundamental vulnerability
of such interconnected systems is eavesdropping attacks, espe-
cially when the underlying medium of communication is of a
broadcast nature, i.e. as in wireless systems [8]. Eavesdroppers
are usually passive adversaries, which intercept unauthorized
data. This data leakage, not only compromises confidentiality,
but could be also used to perform more complex attacks [9].
In this paper, we study eavesdropping attacks in the context
of real-time dynamical systems, where the source of informa-
tion is a dynamical system. In many IoT applications, sensors
collect state information about the dynamical system and send
it to an authorized user, i.e. a controller, a cloud server, etc.
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Fig. 1. This figure presents an abstract description of our problem. A
sensor sends confidential information about the state of a dynamical system
to an authorized user (i.e. a controller, the cloud) over a wireless channel.
Meanwhile, an eavesdropper might intercept the sent messages. Our goal is
to design encoder-decoder pairs such that confidentiality is protected.
through a (wireless) channel, see Figure 1. Our goal is to
design codes such that the user receives the confidential state
information, while any eavesdroppers are confused about the
true state. One of the main challenges in designing such codes
for real-time dynamical systems is time itself; in general, it
is desirable to avoid elaborate codes which might introduce
severe delays to the data processing of the user.
Most of the current defense mechanisms involve
cryptography-based tools [10] against computationally
limited adversaries. However, these are generic tools that do
not exploit the properties of the underlying physical process,
i.e. the communication channel or the system’s dynamics.
Moreover, encryption may also introduce computation and
communication overheads, which are significant for real-time
systems [11]. This motivates the development of other
approaches for reinforcing confidentiality.
One such approach includes developing defense mecha-
nisms in the physical layer of wireless communications [12],
[13]. These methods exploit the characteristics of the un-
derlying channel used for communication, e.g., the wireless
medium, to offer provable guarantees about confidentiality
against eavesdroppers. Information-theoretic approaches [14]–
[16] define a notion of secrecy capacity of channels and
give conditions about the existence of codes such that the
eavesdropper receives no information. However, finding such
codes is challenging in practice and requires knowledge of
the eavesdropper’s channel, which may not be available.
Nonetheless, in the case of packet erasure channels, those
erasures can be exploited to randomly create secrets, thus
leading to more practical defense mechanisms [17]. Still, the
aforementioned approaches typically involve static sources
which is not the case in dynamical systems. Recently, in [18],
[19], [20], information-theoretic tools were applied in the case
of dynamical systems, to the problem of remote estimation
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2in the presence of eavesdroppers. As with the static case,
those approaches also face the challenge of finding codes and
requiring knowledge about the eavesdropper’s channel.
A control-theoretic approach was recently employed in [21],
[22], where the performance metric of both the user and the
eavesdropper is minimum mean square error (mmse). This
framework does not use any encoding. Instead, a secrecy
mechanism is employed, which withholds information, either
randomly [21] or deterministically [22]. In the case of unstable
systems, under certain conditions, the eavesdropper’s expected
error can grow to infinity while the user’s expected error
remains bounded. However, the main disadvantage of those
works is that the guarantees about the eavesdropper are in
expectation, not almost surely, while the user’s performance
is degraded as a side effect.
In this paper, we develop a novel class of codes, suitable
for real-time dynamical systems, which we call State-Secrecy
Codes. When direct state measurements are available, the
system’s state is encoded by subtracting a weighted version
of the user’s most recently received state from the current
state. This only requires acknowledgment signals from the
user back to the sensor. By exploiting the inherent process
noise of the physical system, the channel’s randomness as
well as the dynamics, State-Secrecy Codes achieve very strong
guarantees with very low computational cost. In particular,
confidentiality is guaranteed if at some time the user receives
the encoded state, while the eavesdropper fails to intercept
it. Due to our code, a single occurrence of this event, which
we call critical event, makes the eavesdropper lose important
information about the system state. Then, as time passes, the
dynamics amplify the uncertainty of the eavesdropper created
by this information loss, regardless of the eavesdropper’s
computational capabilities.
In Section II we present the problem formulation. The
dynamical system is modeled as linear, while the channel,
is modeled as a packet drop channel. Similar to [19]–[21],
we assume that the system is unstable (see Section II for
discussion). Both the user and the eavesdropper know the
coding scheme and use minimum mean square error estimators
as decoders. We also introduce a novel control-theoretic notion
of perfect secrecy, requiring that the eavesdropper’s error
grows unbounded almost surely, while the user’s performance
is optimal. In Section III, where direct state measurements
are available, we show that by employing State-Secrecy
Codes, perfect secrecy can be guaranteed under remarkably
mild conditions (Theorem 1). It is sufficient for the critical
event, where the user receives the corresponding packet while
the eavesdropper misses it, to occur at least once. Even
one occurrence renders the eavesdropper’s error unbounded
with asymptotically optimal rate of increase (Corollary 1).
In Section IV, we extend the results to the case of output
measurements (Theorem 2). The sensor performs local Kalman
filtering before applying a State-Secrecy Code to the local
estimates.
In summary, our main contributions, are the following:
• We introduce State-Secrecy Codes, which are fast and
efficient, thus, suitable for real-time dynamical systems.
Their efficiency does not depend on the computational
capabilities of the eavesdropper, contrary to encryption
techniques [10].
• The codes achieve unbounded eavesdropper’s error al-
most surely, while the user’s estimation performance
is optimal. This supersedes the results in [21], [22]
where unbounded eavesdropper’s error is achieved only
in expectation and the user’s performance is degraded.
• The condition for perfect secrecy is remarkably minimal,
requiring just a single occurrence of the critical event.
• The assumptions about the channel are minimal. Thus,
our results are distribution free.
We conclude this paper by illustrating the performance of
the State-Secrecy Codes in simulations in Section V, and
with remarks in Section VI. All proofs are included in the
Appendices.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Dynamical system model
The considered remote estimation architecture is shown in
Figure 2 and consists of a sensor observing a dynamical
system, a legitimate user, and an eavesdropper. The dynamical
system is linear and has the following form:
xk+1 = Axk + wk+1 (1)
yk = Cxk + vk (2)
where xk ∈ Rn is the state, yk ∈ Rm is the output and k ∈ N
is the (discrete) time. Matrices A ∈ Rn×n and C ∈ Rm×n are
the system and output matrices respectively. Signals wk ∈ Rn
and vk ∈ Rm are the process and measurement noises
respectively and are modeled as independent Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and covariance matrices Q and R
respectively. The initial state x0 is also a Gaussian random
variable with zero mean and covariance Σ0 and is independent
of the noise signals. Matrices Q, R, Σ0 are assumed to be
positive definite (unless otherwise stated). In more compact
notation Q, R, Σ0  0, where  () denotes comparison
in the positive definite (semidefinite) cone. We also assume
that the pair (A,C) is detectable. All system and noise pa-
rameters A,C,Q,R,Σ0 are assumed to be public knowledge,
available to all involved entities, i.e., the sensor, the user, and
the eavesdropper. We also note that we consider a common
probability space Ω for all random quantities (noises, initial
condition and channel outcomes). Throughout this paper, we
assume the system is unstable.
Assumption 1. We assume that the dynamical system (1) is
unstable i.e., its spectral radius is ρ(A) = maxi|λi(A)|> 1.
From a security point of view, we can achieve much
better confidentiality when the system is unstable; without any
measurements, the unstable dynamics amplify the uncertainty
caused by the process noise. On the other hand, when the
system is stable, the problem is more challenging. The eaves-
dropper can always predict that a stable system is close to
equilibrium without even eavesdropping. We do not deal with
stable systems in this paper, but it is subject of ongoing work.
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Fig. 2. A sensor collects the output yk of the dynamical system (1). Then it
transmits an encoded version zk of the output to the channel, which is neither
reliably nor securely received by the user. The packets might be dropped, as
captured by γu,k , and might be intercepted by the eavesdropper, as captured
by γk . To decode the messages, the user and the eavesdropper compute the
minimum mean square error (mmse) estimates xˆu,k and xˆk respectively.
B. Channel model
The sensor communicates over a channel with two out-
puts/receivers as shown in Figure 2. The input to the channel
is denoted by zk ∈ Rn. The first output, denoted by hu,k,
is the authorized one to the user, while the second, denoted
by hk, is the unauthorized one to the eavesdropper. Commu-
nication follows the packet-based paradigm commonly used
in networked control systems [23], [24]. We assume that the
packets consist of sufficiently large number of bits to neglect
quantization effects [23]–[25].
Communication with the user is unreliable, i.e., may un-
dergo packet drops. Additionally, communication is not secure
against the eavesdropper, i.e., the latter may intercept trans-
mitted packets. In particular, we denote by γu,k ∈ {0, 1} the
outcome of the user packet reception at time k, and by γk ∈
{0, 1} the outcome of the eavesdropper’s packet interception.
When γu,k = 1 (or γk = 1), then the reception (interception)
is successful. Otherwise the reception (interception) is not
successful and the respective packet is dropped. Thus, the
outputs of the channel are modeled as:
hu,k =
{
zk, if γu,k = 1
ε, if γu,k = 0
hk =
{
zk, if γk = 1
ε, if γk = 0
(3)
for i = 1, 2, where symbol ε, is used to represent the “no
information” outcome. The variables {γu,k, γk, k = 0, 1, . . . }
are modeled as random and assumed to be independent of the
initial state x0, the process noise wk, and the measurement
noise vk, for k = 0, 1, . . . . We do not assume any specific joint
distribution of the channel outcomes; as explained in Section
III the results of this paper (Theorems 1, 2) are distribution-
free.
In addition to the main channel, the user can reliably send
acknowledgment signals back to the sensor via the reverse
channel. Thus, at any time step the sensor knows what is the
latest received message zk at the user. Meanwhile, we assume
that the eavesdropper is able to intercept all acknowledgment
signals, and thus, knows the history of user’s packet successes.
In that respect, we model a powerful eavesdropper. On the
other hand, neither the sensor nor the user have any knowledge
about the eavesdropper’s intercept successes γk.
C. Encoder definition
The sensor collects output measurements yk and encodes
them by sending zk ∈ Rp over the channel at each time step
k, where p is an integer to be designed. Hence, under this
definition and by (3), the channel outputs hu,k, hk take values
in Rp∪{ε}. In general, the encoder may produce zk, given all
the information at the sensor at time k, i.e. current and past
outputs yt for t ≤ k, past sent messages zt for t < k, as well
as past user’s channel outcomes γu,t for t < k:
zk = fk (yk, yt, zt, γu,t, t < k) , (4)
where fk is a function from Rm(k+1)+pk × {0, 1}k to Rp.
Although this allows encoders with infinite memory, our
proposed one (see Sections III, IV) does not need the whole
history and, thus, only uses finite memory.
D. MMSE Estimation
Both the user and the eavesdropper know the encoding
scheme and use the minimum mean square error (mmse)
estimate to decode the received/intercepted messages. This
estimate depends on their information up to time k. So,
we define the batch vector of received channel outputs
hu,0:k = (hu,0, . . . , hu,k) and channel outcomes γu,0:k =
(γu,0, . . . , γu,k) for the user. Similarly, for the eavesdropper,
we define h0:k = (h0, . . . , hk) and γ0:k = (γ0, . . . , γk). Then,
the user’s information at time k is denoted by Iuk = {hu,0:k},
with Iu−1 = ∅. Respectively, we denote the eavesdropper’s
information at time k by
Ik =
{
h0:k,γu,0:k
}
, I−1 = ∅ (5)
The two information sets are not symmetric, i.e. the eaves-
dropper has the additional information of the user’s reception
success history. With those definitions, the mean square error
estimate, xˆu,k, at the user and the respective estimation error
covariance matrix Pu,k are given by:
xˆu,k = E {xk|Iuk } , Pu,k = Cov {xk|Iuk } (6)
where the conditional covariance of any random vector Z with
respect to some other random vector I is defined as
Cov {Z|I} = E{(Z − E {Z|I}) (Z − E {Z|I})′ |I} .
Similarly, the eavesdropper’s mean square error estimate, xˆk
and the respective estimation covariance matrix Pk are:
xˆk = E {xk|Ik} , Pk = Cov {xk|Ik} . (7)
E. Problem
The goal of this work is to design the encoding scheme at
the sensor, so that perfect secrecy is achieved, introduced in the
following definition. We require the eavesdropper’s estimation
error to grow unbounded, while the user successfully decodes
the information and has optimal estimation performance. The
user’s estimation scheme is optimal when at the successful
reception times, the estimate and estimation error covariance
are the same as if no packet had been dropped in the past (see
also [26]).
4Definition 1 (Perfect Secrecy). Given system (1), (2) and
channel model (3), we say that a coding scheme (4) achieves
perfect secrecy if and only if both of the following conditions
hold:
(i) the user’s performance is optimal:
xˆu,k = E {xk|y0:k}
Pu,k = Cov {xk|y0:k}
}
, when γu,k = 1, (8)
where y0:k = (y0, . . . , yk).
(ii) the eavesdropper’s error diverges to infinity with prob-
ability one:
trPk
a.s.→ ∞1, (9)
where tr is the trace operator.
This notion of secrecy is asymptotic, which is an inherent
property of the problem. Even without any interceptions, the
eavesdropper can maintain the trivial open-loop prediction
estimate, i.e. xˆk = 0, that has unbounded but finite estimation
error at any time k. Moreover, we remark that (9) guarantees
aggregate state secrecy in that, at least one but not necessarily
all eigenvalues of the eavesdropper’s error covariance grow
unbounded, e.g., she might still be able to estimate a stable
part of the state with bounded error (see also Section V). With
this definition, we formally present the problem that we solve
in this paper.
Problem. Given system (1), (2) and channel model (3), design
a coding scheme (4) such that perfect secrecy is achieved, as
described in Definition 1.
In the following sections, we consider present and analyze
State-Secrecy Codes for two cases. In Section III, we ignore
the output model (C = I , R = 0) and assume that the sensor
measures the state perfectly. In Section IV, we include the
output model (general C, R  0). In both cases, perfect
secrecy is achieved by exploiting the acknowledgment signals,
the unstable system dynamics, the process noise, as well as
the randomness of the channel.
III. PERFECT SECRECY WITH STATE MEASUREMENTS
In this section, we introduce State-Secrecy Codes for the
case of direct state measurements (C = I and R = 0).
Informally, the sensor encodes and transmits the current state
measurement xk as a weighted state difference of the form
xk − Ak−tkxtk , where xtk is a previous state called the
reference state of the encoded message, for some tk < k
depending on k. The sensor and the user can agree on this
reference state via the acknowledgment signals, e.g., it can be
the most recent state received at the user’s end. At the user’s
side, no information is lost with this encoding; upon receiving
a new message xk − Ak−tkxtk , she can first recover xk by
adding Ak−tkxtk and then notify the sensor to use xk as the
reference state for the next transmission.
On the other hand, on the event that the eavesdropper fails
to intercept that reference packet xtk at time tk, her error
1The limit a.s.→ denotes almost sure convergence [27] with respect to the
common probability space Ω, as k →∞.
Algorithm 1 State-Secrecy Code
Input: A and xk at each k ≥ 0
Output: Encoded signals zk, for all k ≥ 0.
Let t represent the time of user’s most recent message.
1: Initialize t = −1, x−1 = 0
2: for k = 0, 1, . . . do
3: Transmit zk = xk −Ak−txt
4: if Acknowledgment received then t = k
5: end if
6: end for
starts increasing. That is because the eavesdropper misses
the reference state xtk and, thus, cannot decode a following
packet of the form xk −Ak−tkxtk to obtain xk. But this also
obstructs the eavesdropper from decoding future packets, as
any following reference state xk for some k > tk, depends
on the current reference state xtk and so on. This triggers
an irreversible chain reaction effect, which combined with the
unstable system dynamics, leads to an exponentially growing
eavesdropper’s estimation error. For this reason, we call this
event, where the user receives a packet at time tk while the
eavesdropper misses it, the critical event.
The following definitions formally describe our coding
scheme. We define the reference time tk to be the time of
the most recent successful reception at the user before k:
tk = tk(γu,0:k−1) = max {0 ≤ t < k : γu,k = 1} . (10)
Until the first successful transmission, i.e. when the set
max {0 ≤ t < k : γu,t = 1} is empty, we use the convention
tk = −1. Respectively, xtk is called the reference state, with
x−1 = 0.
Definition 2 (State-Secrecy Code). Given the unstable system
matrix A in (1), a State-Secrecy Code applies the following
time-varying linear operation
zk = xk −Ak−tkxtk , (11)
where tk is the reference time defined in (10). 
The intuition about selecting the weighting factor At−tk can
be found in Remark 1. The implementation of the scheme is
described in Algorithm 1. The sensor keeps in memory the
reference time tk and state xtk , with t0 = −1, x−1 = 0. At
each time k, it transmits zk as in (11). If the user receives
the packet successfully, it sends an acknowledgment signal
back to the sensor. In this case, the sensor updates the
reference time tk+1 = k. Otherwise, it keeps tk+1 = tk.
The memory required for the encoder is minimal (O(n)) and
the only computational burden is a matrix-vector multiplica-
tion (O(n2)). The critical event formally defined below, is
crucial for reinforcing secrecy with our coding scheme.
Definition 3 (Critical event). A critical event occurs at time
k if the user receives the packet, while the eavesdropper fails
to intercept it:
γu,k = 1, γk = 0 (12)
An example to clarify the coding scheme and the critical
event is presented next.
5Example 1. Suppose that for k = 0, 1, 2, 3 we have the
channel outcomes as shown in the first two rows of the
following table:
k 0 1 2 3
user γu,k 0 1 1 1
eavs. γk 1 0 1 1
tk −1 −1 1 2
zk x0 x1 x2 −Ax1 x3 −Ax2
user hu,k ε x1 x2 −Ax1 x3 −Ax2
eavs. hk x0 ε x2 −Ax1 x3 −Ax2
Then, the last four rows of the table are constructed using the
definitions of the reference times (10), of the coding scheme
(11), and the channel outcomes (3). Notice that the critical
event occurs at time k = 1, where the user receives x1,
while the eavesdropper misses it. Then, the user can recover
x2 at time k = 2, adding Ax1 to hu,2. However, since the
eavesdropper does not know x1, she cannot precisely recover
x2. Since γu,2 = 1, x2 is the next reference state at time k = 3.
Thus, the eavesdropper will also not be able to recover x3,
from h3 = x3−Ax2. Hence, a single occurrence of the critical
event impairs future estimation at the eavesdropper. 
Our first result, for the case of state measurements, formally
proves the previous observations and is presented in the
following theorem. If the critical event {γu,k0 = 1, γk0 = 0}
occurs at some time k0, then the eavesdropper’s error starts
to grow unbounded exponentially fast. On the other hand, the
user’s performance is optimal.
Theorem 1 (Perfect secrecy). Consider system (1), with
channel model (3) and coding scheme (11). If
P(γu,k = 1, γk = 0, for some k ≥ 0) = 1, (13)
then:
(i) perfect secrecy is achieved according to Definition 1.
(ii) conditioned on the event {γu,k0 = 1, γk0 = 0} for some
k0 ≥ 0, the eavesdropper’s estimation error grows
unbounded for k ≥ k0 as
trPk ≥ cρ (A)2(k−k0) , (14)
where Pk is the error covariance defined in (7) and c > 0 is
a constant independent of k0. 
The above theorem is remarkable as the condition (13) for
perfect secrecy is completely minimal; it only requires the
critical event, where the user receives a message without the
eavesdropper intercepting it, to occur at least once. Any joint
distribution of packet receptions and interceptions that satisfies
this condition is covered, and in this sense the result is channel-
free, and holds in cases of practical interest – see Remark 2.
The proof of Theorem 1 is included in the Appendix and is
a consequence of the following lemma, which can be thought
as the worst case, in terms of secrecy, of Theorem 1. That is
when the critical event {γu,k0 = 1, γk0 = 0} occurs at time
k0 and the eavesdropper receives all the following packets for
k > k0.
Lemma 1 (Worst case analysis). Consider system (1) with
channel model (3) and coding scheme (11). Suppose that both
events
B = {γu,k0 = 1, γk0 = 0} and (15)
C = {γk = 1, for all k ≥ k0 + 1} (16)
occur for some k0 ≥ 0. Then
Pk = A
k−k0Pk0 (A
′)k−k0 (17)
for k ≥ k0 in B ∩ C. 
Notice that the equation Pk = Ak−k0Pk0 (A
′)k−k0 is
unstable with rate ρ (A)2. Hence, even in the most pessimistic
scenario for confidentiality, the eavesdropper still has un-
bounded error. In the general case when the eavesdropper does
not intercept all packets after k0, the eavesdropper’s error will
be even larger (cf. Lemma 5 in Appendix) and verifies the
result of Theorem 1.
Remark 1. The choice of Ak−tk is pivotal for achieving
secrecy. The difference xk − Ak−tkxtk is actually a linear
combination of the process noise signals from time tk + 1 up
to k
xk −Ak−tkxtk =
k∑
j=tk+1
Ak−jwj
as follows from the system dynamics (1). If the critical event
occurs at some time k0, then the eavesdropper permanently
loses all information about the process noise wk0 at time k0.
This loss of information is amplified by the unstable system
dynamics over time leading to the eavesdropper’s unbounded
error. 
Remark 2. Suppose that the channel outcomes are inde-
pendent over time, and suppose that there is a positive
probability that the critical event occurs at any time k, i.e.,
P (γu,k = 1, γk = 0) > δ > 0. For example in a wireless
communication setting this may be due to attenuation of the
transmitted signal at the eavesdropper or due to environmen-
tal interference. Then condition (13) for perfect secrecy by
Theorem 1 follows from the Borel-Cantelli lemma [27]. 
A. Rate of increase of eavesdropper’s error covariance
Another property of the proposed coding scheme is that
the rate of increase of the eavesdropper’s error covariance
is asymptotically optimal. Once the critical event occurs, the
eavesdropper’s error behaves asymptotically as the open loop
prediction error, i.e. when all measurements are lost, which is
the largest possible error for the eavesdropper.
Formally, let us denote the open-loop prediction estimate
and error covariance matrix by:
xopk = E {xk} , P opk = Cov {xk} , (18)
which implies:
P opk = AP
op
k−1A
′ +Q, (19)
with P op0 = Σ0. The expected eavesdropper’s error is always
smaller than the open-loop prediction error since it holds that:
P opk = Cov {xk}  E {Cov {xk|Ik}} = E {Pk} (20)
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Fig. 3. In the case of output measurements, the sensor locally implements
a Kalman Filter and computes the estimates x¯k . Then, it forms the encoded
signal zk based on these local estimates x¯k .
for any information set Ik, where the inequality follows by
[27, p. 230]. Thus, the open-loop prediction error is the
maximum possible in expectation.
The following result, which is a corollary of Theorem 1,
shows that the open-loop prediction error covariance is upper
bounded by a multiple of the eavesdropper’s error, where the
multiplicative constant depends on the time k0 of the first
critical event. This implies that the rate of increase of our
coding scheme is asymptotically optimal with respect to the
eavesdropper’s error once the critical event occurs.
Corollary 1 (Rate of increase). Consider system (1), with
channel model (3) and coding scheme (11). Let k0 be the
first time the critical event (12) occurs. Let also P opk , Pk be
the open-loop prediction error covariance (19) and estimation
error covariance (7) matrices respectively. Then,
trP opk ≤ cρ(A)−2k0 (trPk + 1) , (21)
where c > 0 is some constant independent of k0 
The determining factor in the above inequality is the time
k0 of the first critical event. If the critical event occurs more
than once, although the eavesdropper’s error gets larger, its
rate of growth does not differ from the case when it occurs
just once. If the probability of the critical event occurring is
one, then also P
(
ρ(A)−2k0 > 0
)
= 1. Hence, with even a
single occurrence, the error starts increasing as in the open-
loop asymptotically, which is a very strong guarantee.
One caveat is that the first time k0 the critical event occurs is
in general random and not in our control. If the eavesdropper’s
interception rate is very high, the event may take some time
to occur. Then, the term ρ(A)−2k0 is smaller, which means
that secrecy is compromised at the first time steps.
Remark 3. A possible remedy to accelerate the critical
event, is to force it by using a complementary and perhaps
more expensive encoding, e.g., encryption. In this case, it
is sufficient to securely and reliably transmit just the first
packet at time k = 0 using the complementary scheme. Then,
letting our cheap coding scheme take over achieves perfect
secrecy. In that sense, State-Secrecy Codes can be effectively
used alongside other coding schemes. Theorem 1 allows us
to concentrate our more expensive defense efforts in a single
transmission and still achieve perfect secrecy.
IV. PERFECT SECRECY WITH OUTPUT MEASUREMENTS
In this section, we adapt the coding scheme (11) to achieve
perfect secrecy in the case of output measurements (general
C, R  0). This is achieved at the expense of some addi-
tional computational cost at the sensor. Before transmitting
and before applying any coding, we propose that the sensor
implements a local Kalman filter scheme (see also [24]) as
shown in Figure 3 and computes the local estimates:
x¯k = E {xk|y0:k} , x¯−1 = E {x0} = 0 (22)
with prediction error covariance matrix:
P¯k+1|k = Cov {xk+1|y0:k} , P¯0|−1 = Cov {x0} = Σ0 (23)
where y0:k = (y0, . . . , yk). Next, the sensor applies a State-
Secrecy Code to the local state estimates:
zk = x¯k −Ak−tk x¯tk , (24)
similar to the code in (11) with tk being the reference time
defined in (10).
Now, recall that in the classic Kalman filter derivation [28],
we have the following recursive equation:
x¯k = Ax¯k−1 +Kk (yk − CAx¯k−1) = Ax¯k−1 +Kkw¯k, (25)
where we use w¯k to denote the innovation sequence yk −
CAx¯k−1 and
Kk = P¯k|k−1C ′
(
CP¯k|k−1C ′ +R
)−1
is the Kalman gain. It follows that the innovation sequence
yk − CAx¯k−1 is Gaussian white noise [28] with covariance
CP¯k|k−1C ′ +R. In this sense, equation (25) is similar to the
state equation (1).
Since the pair (A,C) is detectable and Q  0 (so that(
A,Q1/2
)
is controllable), the prediction matrix P¯k|k−1 of
the Kalman filter converges to a limit P¯ , which is the positive
semidefinite solution of the discrete algebraic Riccati equation:
P¯ = AP¯A′ +Q−AP¯C ′ (CP¯C ′ +R)−1 CP¯A′ (26)
while the Kalman gain converges to
K = P¯C ′
(
CP¯C ′ +R
)−1
. (27)
We assume that at time k = 0 the sensor has an initial local
state estimate with covariance equal to the steady state error
covariance Σ0 = P¯ . Since the Kalman filter converges fast, it
is reasonable to assume that it has already converged at the
beginning of the system operation.
The main result of this section is presented in the following
theorem. It states that coding scheme (24) achieves the same
perfect secrecy guarantees as in the case of direct state
information case in Section III. The user’s estimation error
is optimal, while just a single occurrence of the critical event
renders the eavesdropper’s error unbounded with exponential
rate of increase.
Theorem 2. Consider system (1) with output model (2),
channel model (3), coding scheme (24) and Σ0 = P¯ . If
P(γu,k = 1, γk = 0, for some k ≥ 0) = 1, (28)
then:
(i) perfect secrecy is achieved according to Definition 1.
(ii) conditioned on the event {γu,k0 = 1, γk0 = 0} for some
k0 ≥ 0, the eavesdropper’s estimation error grows
unbounded for k ≥ k0 as
trPk ≥ cρ (A)2(k−k0) − c′, (29)
7where Pk is the error covariance defined in (7) and c, c′ > 0
are some constants independent of k0. 
To prove Theorem 2, we can use the techniques of the
previous section to show an intermediate result first; that
the eavesdropper’s error with respect to x¯k grows unbounded
when the critical event occurs, as the following lemma states.
We denote the mean square estimate of x¯k and the correspond-
ing conditional error covariance matrix by:
ηk = E {x¯k|Ik} , Hk = Cov {x¯k|Ik} , (30)
with Σ¯0 = Cov {x¯0} = K
(
CP¯C ′ +R
)
K ′.
Lemma 2. Consider system (1) with output model (2), channel
model (3), coding scheme (24) and Σ0 = P¯ . Conditioned
on the event B = {γu,k0 = 1, γk0 = 0} for some k0 ≥ 0,
the eavesdropper’s estimation error with respect to x¯k grows
unbounded for k ≥ k0 as
trHk ≥ cρ (A)2(k−k0) (31)
where Hk is the error covariance defined in (30) and c > 0
is a constant independent of k0. 
We use this intermediate result to show that the eavesdrop-
per’s error with respect to xk also grows unbounded when
the critical event occurs. The main idea is to lower-bound the
error trPk in terms of trHk. The proof is included in the
Appendix.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section we illustrate the efficiency of our pro-
posed coding schemes in numerical simulations. We consider
two scenarios. In the first one, we contrast the performance
achieved by the State-Secrecy Codes with the one achieved
by the mechanisms in [21], [22]. The comparison is made
assuming direct state measurements. In the second one, we
compare the user’s and eavesdropper’s estimation performance
in the case of output measurements. The system under consid-
eration has state matrix A =
[
1.2 0.1
0 0.5
]
and process noise
covariance matrix Q =
[
0.6 0.2
0.2 0.5
]
. For the channel model,
we assume that the channel outcomes are independent across
time and stationary with probabilities P (γu,k = i, γk = j) =
pij , for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. For the estimation scheme of the
eavesdropper we used equation (35) in Appendix. Since the
user can decode all signals, we used the formula:
Pu,k =
{
P¯ −KCP¯ if γu,k = 1
APu,k−1A′ +Q if γu,k = 0
where P¯−KCP¯ = 0 in the case of direct state measurements.
In the first scenario, with direct state information (C = I ,
R = 0), we assume that the channel outcomes have the
probabilities p11 = 0.54, p00 = 0.04, p01 = 0.06 and
p10 = 0.36 and initial state error covariance matrix Σ0 = Q.
We compare the performance of our code with the one of the
mechanisms in [21] and [22]–see Figure 4. The comparison is
made for the same sequence of channel outcomes, with respect
to the user’s and eavesdropper’s estimation errors (tr (Pu,k)
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Fig. 4. We compare our proposed coding scheme with the mechanisms
in [21], [22] for a typical channel outcome sequence in the case of direct
state measurements. For the log-plots, we use function log(x+ 1) instead of
log(x). We observe that it significantly outperforms the mechanisms in both
confidentiality (eavesdropper’s error) and efficiency (user’s error).
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Fig. 5. We compare the eavesdropper’s, user’s and open loop errors for
the states x1 and x2 in the case of output measurements. Notice that the
critical event occurs at time k = 11. The eavesdropper’s error regarding the
unstable part grows unbounded with asymptotically the same rate as the open-
loop error. The eavesdropper still has knowledge about the stable state x2.
However, the open-loop prediction error for x2 shows that the eavesdropper
has bounded error with respect to the stable dynamics, regardless the code.
and tr (Pk) respectively). For the mechanism in [21], which
randomly withholds state information with probability p, we
selected p = 0.29. For the infinite horizon mechanism in [22],
which transmits state information only if the user loses more
than s consecutive packets, we used s = 5. Notice that the
eavesdropper’s error is small very often under the mechanisms
in [21] and [22], since unboundedness is guaranteed in ex-
pectation, not almost surely. In contrast, our coding scheme
achieves unbounded eavesdropper’s error for every channel
sequence with probability one. Also notice that the user’s
estimation performance is degraded in [21], [22].
For the second scenario with output state measurements, we
assume that C =
[
1 1
]
, R = 1 and the channel outcomes
8have the probabilities p11 = 0.7, p00 = 0.1, p01 = 0.1 and
p10 = 0.1. We also assume Σ0 = P¯ (see (26)). In Figure 5,
we plot the user’s and eavesdropper’s estimation errors over
time for the states x1 and x2, i.e. the two diagonal elements
of the covariance matrices respectively. We also plot the
open-loop prediction error (see (19)), to compare it with the
eavesdropper’s error. As shown in Figure 5, the eavesdropper’s
error for the unstable state x1 starts growing unbounded at time
k = 11, when the first critical event occurs; the rate of increase
is the asymptotically the same as in the open-loop case. It is
worth noting that the eavesdropper’s error for the stable state
x2 remains bounded. But it is fundamentally impossible to
have unbounded error for the stable part, regardless the code,
as even the open-loop prediction error is bounded for state x2.
VI. CONCLUSION
The presence of an eavesdropper adds new challenges to
the problem of remote estimation. Nonetheless, by using a
simple State-Secrecy Code, based on acknowledgment signals
from the user back to the sensor, we can achieve powerful
confidentiality guarantees with minimal computational cost. At
the same time the user’s estimation performance is optimal.
By exploiting the random packet erasures, the process noise,
and the unstable dynamics, perfect secrecy is achieved with
just a single occurrence of the critical event, when the user
receives more information than the eavesdropper.
Future work includes an implementation and experimental
evaluation of the proposed scheme. We also seek to compare
the computational load of encryption with that of our code.
Another open question is how to adapt State-Secrecy Codes
to offer more confidentiality guarantees for the stable part of
the state. Finally, adapting State-Secrecy Codes to closed-loop
control systems is an interesting future direction.
APPENDIX A
ESTIMATION FORMULAS
In this appendix, we derive two formulas for the eavesdrop-
per’s estimation error covariance in the case of state measure-
ments. The first one, equation (35) in Lemma 4, expresses
the conditional expectation with respect to the non-Gaussian
eavesdropper’s information Ik (see (5)) in terms of conditional
expectations with respect to Gaussian variables. The second
one, equation (37) in Proposition 1, is the main estimation
formula, which will be used to prove Lemma 1. An identical
analysis can be followed to find the estimation formulas for
ηk, Hk in (30) for the case of output measurements. Thus, it
is omitted.
We denote by x0:k =
[
x′k, . . . , x
′
0
]′
the batch state vector
up to time k taking values in R(k+1)n. We also denote the
batch channel outcomes up to time k by
g0:k =
(
γu,0:k,γ0:k
)
= (γu,0, . . . , γu,k, γ0, . . . , γk) (32)
taking values in the set {0, 1}2k+2. Now let
s0:k = (su,0, . . . , su,k, s0, . . . , sk)
be any fixed element of {0, 1}2k+2. For symbol economy, we
write s = s0:k and we omit the subscript 0 : k. Given this
element s, we define s0:m = (su,0, . . . , su,m, s0, . . . , sm) to
be the part of s until time m, for m ≤ k. We also define
su,0:m = (su,0, . . . , su,m) to be the part of s related to the
user until time m, for m ≤ k.
Next, we alternatively describe the information Ik that the
eavesdropper has on the event that the channel outcomes g0:k
take exactly the value s. Formally it is the set
Jk (s) = {zm (s) : sm = 1, m ≤ k} , where
zm (s) = xm −Am−tm(su,0:m−1)xtm(su,0:m−1)
(33)
and tm (·) is defined in (10). In other words, given fixed chan-
nel outcomes, the eavesdropper only keeps the successfully
intercepted channel outputs from h0:k (see (3)). Notice that
every element of Jk (s) depends linearly on x0:k. The next
example clarifies this definition.
Example 2. Suppose we are given s = s0:2 =
(su,0, su,1, su,2, s0, s1, s2) = (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1). Then, t0(s) =
−1, t1(s) = t2(s) = 0 and
J2 (s) =
{
x2 −A2x0, x0
}
.
Notice that J2 (s) depends only on x0:2 and is Gaussian. 
A. Sigma algebra of Ik.
Before we prove the estimation formulas, we describe the
sigma-algebra σ (Ik), induced by the eavesdropper’s informa-
tion Ik (see (5)). The following lemma describes the sigma
algebra σ (Ik), in terms of σ (Jk (s)).
Lemma 3 (Sigma algebra of Ik). Fix a k and let S =
{0, 1}2k+2. Let Ik, g0:k, and Jk (s) be as defined in (5), (32),
and (33). Then every set D in the sigma algebra of Ik has
the following form:
D =
⋃
s∈S
{g0:k = s,Jk (s) ∈ Fs} , (34)
for some Fs ∈ σ (Jk (s)), for all s ∈ S.
Proof. Since g0:k is a discrete-valued random vector, we can
partition every set D ∈ σ (Ik) according to the values of g0:k
as:
D =
⋃
s∈S
Ds,
where
Ds = {g0:k = s,h0:k ∈ Es} ,
for some set Es that belongs in σ (h0:k). But we have that:
{γt = 0} ⇔ {ht = ε} , for all 0 ≤ t ≤ k.
Thus, if γt = 0 in in Ds, this fully describes ht in Ds. As a
result, the set Ds can be equivalently described by
Ds = {g0:k = s,Jk (s) ∈ Fs} ,
for some Fs ∈ σ (Jk (s)).
9B. First estimation formula
Here, we express the conditional expectation with respect to
Ik in terms of conditional expectations with respect to Jk (s).
This is presented in the following lemma, and is a consequence
of Lemma 3 and independence of x0:k and g0:k.
Lemma 4. Fix a k and let Ik, g0:k, and Jk (s) be as defined
in (5), (32), and (33). Suppose Y = Y (g0:k) is an integrable
random vector, such that:
Y (g0:k) =
∑
s∈S
Y (s)1{g0:k=s}
where Y (s) depends only on x0:m, for some m (possibly
different than k). Then:
E {Y |Ik} = E {Y (s) |Jk (s)} in {g0:k = s} . (35)
By 1 we denote the indicator function. 
Proof. Define S = {0, 1}2k+2. Notice that g0:k is σ (Ik)-
measurable. Thus, we have:
E {Y |Ik} =
∑
s∈S
1{g0:k=s}E {Y (s)|Ik}
= E {Y (s)|Ik} in {g0:k = s} .
Thus, it is sufficient to show that
1{g0:k=s}E {Y (s)|Ik} = 1{g0:k=s}E {Y (s)|Jk (s)} . (36)
Since 1{g0:k=s}E {Y (s)|Ik} = E
{
1{g0:k=s}Y (s)|Ik
}
, the
truth of (36) can be verified if we show the basic property
of conditional expectation:
E
{
1D1{g0:k=s}Y (s)
}
= E
{
1D1{g0:k=s}E {Y (s)|Jk (s)}
}
,
for any D ∈ σ (Ik). From Lemma 3, we have:
D =
⋃
s∈S
Ds,
where
Ds = {g0:k = s,Jk (s) ∈ Fs} ,
for some Fs ∈ σ (Jk (s)). As a result, 1{g0:k=s}1D =
1{g0:k=s}1Jk(s)∈Fs .
Observe that Jk (s) and Y (s) depend only on the values
of xt, t ≤ m, while the indicator 1{g0:k=s} depends on the
channel outcomes. Hence:
E
{
1D1{g0:k=s}Y (s)
}
= E
{
1{g0:k=s}1Jk(s)∈FsY (s)
}
= E
{
1{g0:k=s}
}
E
{
1Jk(s)∈FsY (s)
}
= E
{
1{g0:k=s}
}
E
{
1Jk(s)∈FsE {Y (s)|Jk (s)}
}
= E
{
1{g0:k=s}1Jk(s)∈FsE {Y (s)|Jk (s)}
}
= E
{
1D1{g0:k=s}E {Y (s)|Jk (s)}
}
where the second and fourth equalities follow from inde-
pendence, while the third follows from the properties of
conditional expectation.
The benefit of Equation (35) is that it allows us to work with
Jk (s), which includes only Gaussian elements, that depend
linearly on x0:k. In contrast, it is not easy to work directly
with Ik, which is non-Gaussian.
C. Second estimation formula
We finally prove our main estimation formula for Pk by
leveraging the technical intermediate formula (35).
Proposition 1 (Estimation formula). Consider system (1),
channel (3) under coding scheme (11). Fix any k ≥ 0. Let
the covariance matrix of xk and zk given Ik−1 be written in
a block form:
Cov
{[
xk
zk
]
|Ik−1
}
=
[
Σxx Σxz
Σzx Σzz
]
Then, Σxx = APk−1A′ + Q if k > 0 and Σxx = Σ0 if
k = 0, where Pk−1 is the estimation error covariance of the
eavesdropper at time k− 1 defined in (7), and the conditional
covariance at time k is given by:
Pk = Σxx − γ2,kΣxz (Σzz)†Σzx, (37)
where (·)† denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse [29]. 
Proof. First, we prove the formula for Σxx. When k = 0, I−1
is an empty set, thus, Σxx = Σ0. When k > 0, we argue that
Σxx = APk−1A′ + Q. By the system dynamics in (1) we
have that xk = Axk−1 +wk. But by assumption the noise wk
is independent of the state vectors x0, . . . , xk−1 and of g0:k
and, hence, also independent of Ik−1. Thus, the prediction
estimation is E {xk|Ik−1} = Axˆk−1 and the covariance of
xk − E {xk|Ik−1} given Ik−1 equals Σxx = APk−1A′ +Q.
Second, we prove (37). Fix an element s = s0:k ∈
{0, 1}2k+2, and consider the event C = {g0:k = s0:k}. By
the definition (7) of Pk and equation (35), we have Pk =
Cov {xk|Jk (s0:k)} in C. There exist two cases:
Case I: sk = 0. In this case, by the definition (33), we have
Jk (s0:k) = Jk (s0:k−1). Therefore:
Pk = Cov {xk|Jk (s0:k)} = Cov {xk|Jk (s0:k−1)}
= Cov {xk|Ik−1} = Σxx in C.
where the third equality follows from (35).
Case II: sk = 1. Here, by (35):
Pk = Cov {xk|Jk (s0:k)}
= Cov {xk|Jk (s0:k−1) , zk (s0:k)} , in C,
where zk (s0:k) is defined in (33). Since all variables are
Gaussian, we can compute the posterior estimation error using
the Schur complement formula applied to the covariance
matrix of xk and zk (s0:k) given Jk (s0:k−1) (see [28]). By
(35), in C we have
Cov
{[
xk
zk (s0:k)
]
|Jk (s0:k−1)
}
=
[
Σxx Σxz
Σzx Σzz
]
.
Hence, by the Schur’s complement formula, we have Pk =
Σxx − Σxz (Σzz)† Σzx in C, when sk = 1.
We can describe both cases with one equation:
Pk = Σxx − skΣxz (Σzz)† Σzx in C
= Σxx − γkΣxz (Σzz)† Σzx in C,
since sk = γk in C. But this holds for any event C =
{g0:k = s0:k}. Thus, the result holds everywhere, since the
events {g0:k = s}, s ∈ {0, 1}2k+1 are a partition of the
probability space.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF RESULTS
A. Proof of Lemma 1
We will use induction to prove the formula (17) of the
lemma. For k = k0 it is immediate. Suppose it is true
for k − 1 ≥ k0. Since in C the eavesdropper receives all
packets for k > k0, we have γk = 1, for k > k0.
Hence, according to the recursive formula (37), to find Pk,
we should compute the covariance of xk and zk, conditioned
on Ik−1. By independence of wk from Ik−1, it follows that
xk − E {xk|Ik−1} = A (xk−1 − xˆk−1) + wk. Now, we claim
zk − E {zk|Ik−1} = wk, for k > k0, which we prove in the
next paragraph. Thus, the covariance matrix of xk and zk,
conditioned on Ik−1 is:
Cov
{[
xk
zk
]
|Ik−1
}
=
[
APk−1A′ +Q Q
Q Q
]
, in B ∩ C
Thus, by (37), for k > k0 we have
Pk = APk−1A′ +Q−QQ−1Q = APk−1A′ (38)
in B ∩ C. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, we get (17).
Finally, we prove the claim
zk − E {zk|Ik−1} = wk, for k > k0, in B ∩ C. (39)
Since the critical event happened at time k0, the reference
time at k0 + 1 is tk0+1 = k0 in B (equation (10)). Hence, all
reference times tk , for k > k0 satisfy tk ≥ k0 in B. There
are only two possible cases depending on γu,k−1:
Case I: tk = k − 1 ≥ k0, when γu,k−1 = 1
Case II: tk = tk−1 ≥ k0 when γu,k−1 = 0
In the former one, the intercepted signal by (11) is zk = xk−
Axk−1 = wk. But the process noise wk is independent of
Ik−1, thus, E {wk|Ik−1} = 0 and equation (39) holds. In the
latter one, we have
zk = xk −Ak−tkxtk = xk −Ak−tk−1xtk−1 , (40)
since tk = tk−1. Adding and subtracting Axk−1 at the right
hand side of the above equation, we obtain
zk = xk −Axk−1 +A
(
xk−1 −Ak−1−tk−1xtk−1
)
= wk +Azk−1, (41)
where the second equality follows from the definition of
zk−1 in (11). But k − 1 > k0 (since γu,k−1 = 0), thus,
the eavesdropper has intercepted zk−1, which in turn im-
plies zk−1 = E {zk−1|Ik−1} in B ∩ C (follows from (35)
and properties of conditional expectation). Hence, from (41),
E {zk|Ik−1} = Azk−1 in B ∩ C, which along with (41) prove
equation (39).
B. Monotonicity results.
In this subsection, we prove that the case described in
Lemma 1, where the eavesdropper receives everything after the
critical event, is indeed the worst case of Theorem 1, in terms
of confidentiality. To formally describe the above statement,
we need to define a new channel outcome sequence γ˜u,k, γ˜k
that is coupled with the original outcome sequence γu,k, γk
as follows:
(γ˜u,k, γ˜k) = (γu,k, γk) , for all 0 ≤ k ≤ k0
(γ˜u,k, γ˜k) = (γu,k, 1) , for all k > k0,
(42)
i.e. in this new outcome sequence, the eavesdropper receives
everything after time k0 but the user’s outcomes remain the
same. Similarly to (32), we denote the batch vector of the
new outcomes up to time k by g˜0:k. Next, we define again the
channel outputs (3), the eavesdropper’s information (5) and the
covariance matrix (7), but with the original channel outcomes
γk replaced by γ˜k:
h˜k =
{
zk, if γ˜k = 1
ε, if γ˜k = 0
, I˜k =
{
h˜0:k,γu,0:k
}
, (43)
P˜k = Cov
{
xk|I˜k
}
. (44)
The next lemma formally states that when the eavesdropper
receives all measurements from some time k0 on, then it has
the smallest possible covariance matrix.
Lemma 5 (Comparison lemma). Let Pk be the nominal error
covariance matrix, as defined in (7) and P˜k be the error
covariance matrix of the coupled process as defined in (42)–
(44). Then, with probability one:
Pk  P˜k, for all k ≥ 0. (45)

Before we prove Lemma 5, we prove an intermediate
result. The following lemma compares the estimation error
covariance of a Gaussian random vector x, given two different
Gaussian information sets J1 and J2, when the first informa-
tion set is smaller than the second or J1 ⊆ J2. Intuitively, the
result states that given more information we have less error.
Lemma 6. Let x ∈ Rm be normal and let J1, J2 be two sets,
the elements of which are vectors that depend linearly on x.
Then, if J1 ⊆ J2, we have:
Cov {x|J1}  Cov {x|J2} . (46)
Proof. Since x is normal and the vectors in the sets J1,
J2 depend linearly on x, the joint distributions of (x, Ji),
i = 1, 2 are normal. Then, it is a well know property
of joint normal distributions that the conditional covariance
matrices are constant or E {Cov {x|J1}} = Cov {x|J1} and
E {Cov {x|J2}} = Cov {x|J2} [28].
Next, recall that:
Cov {x|J1} = E {(x− E {x|J1})(x− E {x|J1})′|J1} .
Adding and subtracting E {x|J2}, we obtain the sum of four
terms:
Cov {x|J1} = T1 + T2 + T ′2 + T3,
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where:
T1 =E
{(
x− E {x|J2}
)(
x− E {x|J2}
)′
|J1
}
T2 =E
{(
x− E {x|J2}
)(
E {x|J2} − E {x|J1}
)′
|J1
}
T3 =Cov
{
E {x|J2} |J1
}
Since J1 ⊆ J2, by the tower property:
T1 = E
{
E
[
(x− E {x|J2})(x− E {x|J2})′|J2
]
|J1
}
= E
{
Cov {x|J2} |J1
}
= Cov {x|J2} ,
since Cov {x|J2} is constant. Using similar arguments, we
can show that T2 = 0 since:
E
{
E
[
(x− E {x|J2})(E {x|J2} − E {x|J1})′|J2
]
|J1
}
= E
{
E
[
(x− E {x|J2})|J2
]
(E {x|J2} − E {x|J1})′|J1
}
= E {0|J1} = 0,
where the first equality holds since E {x|J2} − E {x|J1} is
measurable with respect to σ (J2). Finally, T3  0 almost
surely, which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5. Fix some time k ≥ 0. If k ≤ k0 then
equation (45) is trivially satisfied with equality. Since the
channel outcomes are identical up to time k0, then also
Pk = P˜k, for k ≤ k0.
Suppose that k > k0. Fix the original channel outcomes
to be g0:k = s = (su,0, . . . , su,k, s0, . . . , sk), for some s ∈
{0, 1}2k+2. Then due to the coupling we have:
g˜0:k = s˜ = (su,0, . . . , su,k, s0, . . . , sk0 , 1 . . . , 1) .
But from the definition (33), it follows that the set Jk (s)
is included in Jk (s˜). Thus, we have Jk (s) ⊆ Jk (s˜),
where both sets have elements that depend linearly on the
Gaussian x0:k. Hence, if we apply Lemma 6, with x =
x0:k, J1 = Jk (s) and J2 = Jk (s˜), we obtain that
Cov {x0:k|Jk (s)}  Cov {x0:k|Jk (s˜)}, which also implies
that the same relation holds for the n × n submatrices
Cov {xk|Jk (s)}  Cov {xk|Jk (s˜)}. Thus, by (35), we have
Pk  P˜k in {g0:k = s}, for all s ∈ {0, 1}2k+2. Since the
sets {g0:k = s} cover all the probability space, we obtain that
Pk  P˜k with probability one.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Let us first prove equation (14). From the worst case Lemma
1, we obtain that Pk = Ak−k0Pk0 (A
′)k−k0 in B ∩ C. Here,
we prove that for all k ≥ k0:
Pk  Ak−k0Pk0 (A′)k−k0 in B. (47)
From Lemma 5, we obtain that with probability one:
Pk  P˜k,
where P˜k is the error covariance matrix of the coupled channel
outcome sequence as defined in (42)–(44). What remains to
show is that in B, we have P˜k = Ak−k0Pk0 (A′)k−k0 . Notice
that since γ˜u,k0 = γu,k0 and γ˜k0 = γk0 , the following events
are equal:
B˜ = {γ˜u,k0 = 1, γ˜k0 = 0} = B.
Also observe that since γ˜k = 1, k > k0, the event
C˜ = {γ˜k = 1, for all k ≥ k0 + 1} = Ω
is the whole probability space. Thus, applying Lemma 1 for
g0:k replaced with g˜0:k and the events B˜ and C˜, we obtain
P˜k = A
k−k0 P˜k0 (A
′)k−k0 , for k ≥ k0 in B. But since g0:k0
and g˜0:k0 are identical, we have P˜k0 = Pk0 . Combining the
two previous results, we prove (47).
Next, we show that Pk0  Q or Pk0 = Σ0 in B. From
the conditional expectation formula (37) for Pk0 , we get that
when the packet is lost (γk0 = 0), then the estimation error
covariance is equal to the prediction error covariance or Pk0 =
Σxx. Hence by Proposition 1, if k0 > 0, we have Pk0 =
APk0−1A
′ + Q  Q  0 in B, while if k0 = 0, we have
P0 = Σ0  0 in B.
Now, suppose that v is a left-eigenvector of A corresponding
to the spectral radius ρ (A). Then, pre-multiplying and post-
multiplying by v in (47), we obtain:
v′Pkv ≥ ρ (A)2(k−k0) v′Pk0v.
But either Pk0  Q or Pk0 = Σ0, which implies
v′Pkv ≥ cρ (A)2(k−k0) v′v,
where c = min {λmin(Q), λmin(Σ0)} > 0 and λmin(·)
denotes the smallest eigenvalue. This, in turn, proves (14) since
trPk ≥ λmax(Pk) ≥ v
′Pkv
v′v
,
where λmax(·) denotes the largest eigenvalue.
To prove that the coding scheme achieves perfect secrecy,
notice that the user always knows xtk and, thus, she can
completely reconstruct the states xk, when γu,k = 1. But this
exactly implies that the condition (8) of perfect secrecy is satis-
fied, since Pu,k = 0 = Cov {xk|x0:k}, when γu,k = 1 (recall
that yk = xk in the case of state measurements). Finally, (14)
along with the hypothesis (13) prove that trPk → ∞ with
probability one.
D. Proof of Corollary 1
Let ej denote the unit vector of Rn in the j-th direction.
Then
e′jA
iQ(Aj)′ej ≤ ρ (Q)
∥∥Aie′j∥∥22 ≤ ρ (Q)∥∥Ai∥∥22 ,
where
∥∥Ai∥∥
2
is the Euclidean matrix norm. Repeating the
procedure for all j, we obtain the inequality:
trP opk =
k−1∑
i=0
tr
(
AiQ(A′)i
)
+ tr
(
AkΣ0(A
′)k
)
≤ nc1
k∑
i=0
∥∥Ak∥∥2
2
,
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where c1 = max {ρ(Q), ρ(Σ0)}. But by the Gelfand’s formula
[29],
∥∥Ak∥∥
2
∼ ρ(A)k asymptotically, which implies that there
exists a constant c2 > 0 such that:
trP opk ≤ c2
k∑
i=0
ρ(A)2k = c2
ρ(A)2(k+1) − 1
ρ(A)2 − 1 .
On the other hand, suppose that the first critical event occurs
at k0. Then, from Theorem 1, we obtain:
trPk ≥ c3ρ(A)2(k−k0), for k ≥ k0,
for some constant c3 > 0 independent of k0. Combining the
previous two inequalities, we obtain:
trP opk ≤ cρ(A)−2k0 (trPk + 1) (48)
for some constant c > 0 independent of k0.
E. Proof of Lemma 2
Consider equation (25). Since the weighted innovation se-
quence Kw¯k is white noise with covariance
Q¯ = K
(
CP¯C ′ +R
)
K ′,
the steps of the proof of Theorem 1 can be repeated. First,
applying Lemma 1 to system (25) with coding scheme (24)
(with x¯k, ηk, Hk, Q¯ instead of xk, xˆk, Pk, Q), we obtain:
Hk = A
k−k0Hk0 (A
′)k−k0 , for k ≥ k0, in B ∩ C, (49)
where the events B, C are defined in (15), (16).
Second, similar to (47) in the proof of Theorem 1, the
previous equality holds with inequality in B or:
Hk  Ak−k0Hk0 (A′)k−k0 in B. (50)
Third, since the critical event B occurs at k0 then we have:
1) Hk0 = AHk0−1A
′ + Q¯  Q¯ if k0 > 0
2) Hk0 = Cov {x¯0} = Q¯ if k0 = 0.
The part that is different is proving that the trace grows
unbounded. Let v be the (nonzero) left-eigenvector of A
corresponding to the spectral radius ρ (A). Pre-multiplying and
post-multiplying by v in (50), we obtain:
v′Hkv ≥ ρ (A)2(k−k0) v′Hk0v.
But either Hk0  Q¯ or Hk0 = Q¯, which implies
v′Hkv ≥ cρ2(k−k0)v′v,
where
c =
v′Q¯v
v′v
≥ 0.
Since we have
trHk ≥ λmax(Hk) ≥ v
′Hkv
v′v
,
we obtain (31) if we show that c is strictly positive or v′Q¯v >
0. We will argue by contradiction. Suppose that v′Q¯v = 0.
Substituting this in equation (26) we then have:
v′P¯ v = ρ (A)2 v′P¯ v + v′Qv − ρ (A)2 v′Q¯v
= ρ (A)
2
v′P¯ v + v′Qv,
which is a contradiction since Q  0 and v′Qv > 0, while{
1− ρ (A)2
}
v′P¯ v ≤ 0, since the system is unstable. Thus,
v′Q¯v > 0 and c > 0.
F. Proof of Theorem 2
First we prove (29). By optimality of linear estimation we
have that the estimate ηk minimizes the conditional error or:
ηk = arg min
x∈σ(Ik)
E
{
‖x¯k − x‖22 |Ik
}
,
where x ∈ σ(Ik) denotes that x is measurable with respect to
σ(Ik). Thus, if we replace ηk with xˆk, we obtain the following
bound:
trHk = E
{
‖x¯k − ηk‖22 |Ik
}
≤ E
{
‖x¯k − xˆk‖22 |Ik
}
. (51)
Then by the inequality ‖a− b‖22 ≤ 2 ‖a− c‖22 + 2 ‖b− c‖22,
we obtain:
trHk ≤ 2E
{
‖xk − xˆk‖22 |Ik
}
+ 2E
{
‖xk − x¯k‖22 |Ik
}
= 2 trPk + 2 tr
(
P¯ −KCP¯ ) . (52)
The first term of the equality above holds by the equality
trPk = E
{
‖xk − xˆk‖22 |Ik
}
from the definition of Pk in (7).
To show the equality about the second term in (52), by the
tower property:
E
{
‖xk − x¯k‖22 |Ik
}
= E
{
E
{
‖xk − x¯k‖22 |y0:k, g0:k
}
|Ik
}
since σ (Ik) ⊆ σ (y0:k, g0:k). But by independence
E
{
‖xk − x¯k‖22 |y0:k, g0:k
}
= E
{
‖xk − x¯k‖22 |y0:k
}
. The
right-hand expression denotes the estimation error covariance
of the Kalman filter which by assumption is assumed to be
at steady state and hence equals P¯ −KCP¯ , where P¯ is the
steady state prediction error covariance. As a result,
E
{
‖xk − x¯k‖22 |Ik
}
= E
{
tr
(
P¯ −KCP¯ ) |Ik}
= tr
(
P¯ −KCP¯ ) .
which verifies (52). Finally substituting the result of Lemma 2
in (52) we have:
trPk ≥ 1
2
cρ(A)2(k−k0) − tr (P¯ −KCP¯ ) , in B,
for k ≥ k0 and some c > 0 independent of k0, which
proves (29).
To prove that perfect secrecy is achieved (statement (i) of the
Theorem), notice first that the user’s performance is optimal.
At every successful reception time k, the user receives x¯k −
Ak−tk x¯tk and recovers x¯k. As a result, the user knows x¯k
at the successful reception times. But from (22), (23) this is
exactly the optimal estimation scheme as defined in (8). The
fact that the eavesdropper’s error diverges to infinity almost
surely follows from (29) and the hypothesis (28).
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